Hungary’s Election Could End Orbán’s Rule — But Will It End His Power?

Hungary’s parliamentary election on Sunday, April 12, is shaping up to be the most competitive and consequential since Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party returned to power in 2010. After 16 years, during which the Fidesz government systematically captured state institutions, reshaped the electoral system to its advantage, and eroded democratic checks and balances, it now faces a serious electoral challenge from the newcomer Tisza party led by Péter Magyar. Polls suggest that a change in government is no longer implausible. Yet the central question is not only whether Fidesz can be voted out of office, but whether it can be removed from power. Even if defeated, the governing party’s entrenched influence across institutions may endure, constraining the actions of any successor government. Hungary thus stands at a critical juncture: this election is not simply a contest between parties, but a test of whether political turnover can bring meaningful democratic change after prolonged state capture. It offers a rare real-world stress test of how resilient entrenched illiberal systems are when unexpectedly confronted with electoral vulnerability. The trajectory is being watched closely by Orbán’s allies abroad, not the least of which are Russian President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President Donald Trump. Hungary as a Laboratory of Illiberalism After 2010, Fidesz transformed Hungary from a liberal democracy into an electoral autocracy by using the party’s parliamentary supermajority to reshape the political system in ways that preserve the outward appearance of democracy while systematically undermining it. The erosion of democracy has rested on several mutually reinforcing pillars. First, institutional capture has ensured political control over key state bodies, including the Constitutional Court, the public prosecutor’s office, and regulatory authorities. Second, the electoral system has been redesigned to favor the largest party, combining first-past-the-post single-member districts with a compensatory system that amplifies the winner’s advantage — particularly when contested by a fragmented opposition. Third, media capture has reshaped the information environment: the public media fell under party control, private media are dominated by pro-government outlets, while independent outlets face financial challenges and political pressure. These structural changes have been accompanied by a political strategy of sustained polarization. The government has framed politics in existential terms, mobilizing voters through narratives of external threat — whether from migrants, the European Union institutions in Brussels, or more recently, Ukraine, which the government accuses of interfering in the Hungarian election in support of the opposition and posing a direct threat to Hungary’s energy security. Unlike most of its EU allies, the Hungarian government has been actively opposing help to Ukraine while maintaining its close ties with Russia even after the 2022 launch of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In parallel, Orbán and his government have long been portrayed domestic opponents as illegitimate or outright threats to national sovereignty. This narrative is especially strong today, when the Tisza party is accused of conspiring with Ukraine to oust Fidesz. The Rise of a Challenger Against this backdrop, the emergence of Tisza as a serious electoral contender is striking. Until recently, Hungary’s opposition remained fragmented and largely reactive, unable to overcome Fidesz’s dominance. Péter Magyar, an insider-turned-critic, has altered that dynamic. Magyar turned his back on Fidesz in early 2024 following a scandal that saw his former wife, Fidesz’s Minister of Justice Judit Varga, resign over the pardoning of a convicted helper of a pedophile. Riding the public outrage sparked by the scandal, Magyar set out to mobilize people against the governing party. Within a few months, his brand-new party gathered enough support to score 33 percent in the European parliamentary election as runner-up to Fidesz. Rather than engaging on terrain set by the government, Magyar has pursued an autonomous political strategy. He has avoided being drawn into the polarizing narratives the government employs to direct Hungarian political discourse and instead focused on exposing the corruption and hypocrisy of the ruling elite. Over time, this approach has helped erode Fidesz’s thus-far unparalleled ability to dominate the political agenda. Equally important has been Tisza’s organizational strategy. Magyar has invested heavily in building a nationwide political presence, developing active local groups — so-called Tisza Islands — capable of mobilizing against Fidesz across the 106 single-member districts. This footwork has been critical in turning Tisza into a credible political alternative. As Tisza’s support grew with the approaching election, several smaller parties of the “old” opposition have stepped aside, allowing for an unprecedented degree of voter mobilization behind a single challenger. Ultimately, Tisza has succeeded in attracting a broad coalition of voters spanning ideological divides, united by dissatisfaction with the Orbán regime but also drawn by a forward-looking, hopeful message the party put forward. The combination of these factors helped Tisza to hack the system and make it competitive against all odds. Through adaptation to it, rather than mere protest against, the party managed to circumvent the structural constraints of the uneven playing field Fidesz had created. What to Watch on Election Day Despite the increased competitiveness of the race, the conditions under which the election will take place remain deeply uneven. Hungary has not held a fully free and fair election since 2010; elections since have been conducted within a media and institutional environment that systematically favors the incumbent. Public media continues to function as a government communication channel, offering favorable coverage of Fidesz while excluding opposition voices. At the same time, the boundary between state communication and party campaigning has become blurred, with public resources deployed to reinforce the governing party’s messaging. The current campaign, too, reflects these longstanding patterns. Fidesz has relied heavily on negative campaigning and has declined to participate in any public debates. Meanwhile, the opposition operates in a constrained information environment, particularly in rural areas where access to independent media is limited. On election day itself, attention will focus on the scale and distribution of irregularities. Past elections have seen reports of a wide range of manipulation. Instances of vote buying, voter intimidation, organized transportation of voters, and other modes of manipulation are detailed in a recent documentary, revealing that such practices may affect as many as 600,000 voters, which would be almost 10 percent of the expected turnout. Such practices are localized and difficult to document systematically, but they can be decisive in closely contested districts. International election observers, particularly of the internationally well-regarded mission of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE-ODIHR), will play an important role in monitoring the process, potentially deterring more blatant forms of manipulation. However, their capacity is inherently limited, and many forms of irregularity remain hard to detect. The ODIHR mission, however, is not the only one to be present in the country. Concerns were raised about the impartiality of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’s mission, in which a former interpreter for Russia’s Putin, Daria Boyarskaya, fills a key coordinating role. Furthermore, Fidesz-friendly organizations Ordo Iuris and the Edmund Burke Foundation, are also planning to send observers. The presence of both independent and government-friendly observers forecasts a battle of narratives regarding the conduct of the election. The key question is not whether irregularities will occur, but whether they will be widespread and coordinated enough to alter the overall result in Fidesz’s favor, and whether under such circumstances the election can still be considered free. While concerns about extreme scenarios — such as outright annulment of the election result or refusal to transfer power — pop up in public discourse, such moves would carry immediate and harsh political and economic risks for the government and the country as such. EU member states would be forced to condemn and punish a stolen election, while markets would react harshly to the legal uncertainty such a move would trigger. If one or the other party’s lead — based on the polls, that of Tisza — is not clear and significant, a more plausible scenario is one in which the election remains formally free but is contested in specific districts, potentially leading to extended disputes in its aftermath and delays in the formation of a new government. Winning Office. Gaining Power? If current trends hold, Tisza could emerge with a parliamentary majority. The extent of that majority, however, will be decisive. A two-thirds supermajority would not only dispel doubts about the results but also enable constitutional and institutional reforms necessary to begin to dismantle Fidesz’s entrenched system and perhaps allow for a relatively rapid restoration of democratic institutions. Absent such a mandate, however, a new government would face a far more constrained environment. Over the past 16 years, Fidesz has embedded loyalists across a wide array of institutions, many with terms that extend beyond electoral cycles. These include the presidency, the Constitutional Court, the highest court of the judiciary, the public prosecutor’s office, and the national bank. These actors could function as veto players, limiting the government’s ability to implement reforms or pursue accountability. Even routine governance could become difficult, as institutional resistance and legal challenges could slow or block legislation. Access to European funds represents a particularly important dimension. Like other EU member states that are less developed, Hungary is a net beneficiary of financial transfers supporting its economy. Significant portions of Hungary’s EU funding, however, were frozen in 2022 due to concerns over corruption and violations of judicial independence. Tisza has pledged to unlock these resources by implementing reforms, but doing so would require navigating precisely those institutional constraints that Fidesz has entrenched. The experience of Poland following its 2023 parliamentary election offers a relevant comparison. Even faced with less extensive state capture, the new government of Donald Tusk has encountered significant obstacles in reversing the illiberal measures of the previous government of the Law and Justice party, including on judicial independence. Hungary’s deeper level of institutional capture suggests that the challenges would be even more pronounced. Moreover, political instability cannot be ruled out and may evolve into a crisis by next spring. The new government will need the green light of the Fiscal Council — a monitoring body made up of Fidesz-loyalists, namely the presidents of the national bank, the State Audit Office, and the Fiscal Council itself — to adopt the country’s next annual budget by March 2027. If the Council withholds its support, the president may dissolve the parliament and call early elections. This possibility increases the urgency of meaningful restoration and revival of democratic institutions. The Message Beyond Hungary Hungary’s trajectory over the past decade and a half has made it a global poster case of democratic backsliding driven by executive aggrandizement. The system constructed by Orbán retains the facade of democracy while in effect becoming progressively radicalized and serving only the interests of a single political force and its associated business networks. Hungary’s model has resonated beyond its borders. Orbán has positioned himself as a leading figure within transnational far-right networks, cultivating ties with actors especially in Europe and the United States. An ally not only of Putin but also of Trump and his administration, Orbán’s model of governance has become a reference point among those seeking to capture power while still claiming a popular mandate through election. After 16 years, the tide now may be turning as the April 12 election nears. The rise of Tisza demonstrates that even heavily skewed systems can produce openings for opposition forces capable of adapting strategically. But electoral victory alone does not suffice to dismantle entrenched power structures. Hungary’s experience underscores that once democratic institutions have been systematically hollowed out, restoring them is far more difficult than dismantling them was in the first place.